@demica/shared@99.99.100
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev October 8, 2026 at 4:37 AM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-5351
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
On install, the package's postinstall hook (node canary.js postinstall per package.json) issues an unconditional HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path /dc with query params containing the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. No environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted; the payload is limited to package metadata. The README describes this as an authorized dependency-confusion canary against the @demica scope. The fact-of-install ping is otherwise benign, but it performs unconsented outbound network at install time, the destination is a bare IP over cleartext HTTP with no authentication or pinning, and the same postinstall hook is a position from which a future republish could deliver arbitrary payloads. Routing to human review so the @demica organization can confirm the canary is theirs and that the destination IP is operator-controlled.
Source: amazon-inspector (becb5aca9f28fbd99a4f45ed70489960879ba81cfbd2071648c98cf5e867d8f9)
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