@grabcad/company-server-shared@99.0.1

Summary

Package self-describes as a Compatibility shim. for the @grabcad scope and ships no real functionality: index.js exports a Proxy whose property access returns no-op functions, so a build importing the real @grabcad/company-server-shared resolves this placeholder and silently succeeds. On installation, the postinstall script runs node beacon.cjs, and index.js also invokes the same fire() routine on require. The beacon POSTs JSON containing os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), and the Node/npm version to the hardcoded plain-HTTP bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The combination of a scoped placeholder with no legitimate functionality, automatic install-time and require-time execution, and a hardcoded recon callback to an unrelated bare IP is the standard shape of a dependency-confusion attack targeting the private @grabcad scope, leaking internal hostnames and build-path metadata to an attacker-controlled destination.

Source: amazon-inspector (77669bd2c3c9138e7d3ab0612febc058dfd8235eb812a40ffb5bf3f27d19bf47)