alelo-api@99.0.2

Summary

The package fires attacker-controlled code on npm install via both preinstall.js and index.js (postinstall). preinstall.js collects hostname, username, platform, cwd, and the full process.env, JSON-encodes it, and POSTs it over HTTPS with TLS verification disabled to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint https://209.99.185.109/preinstall. The postinstall path reads installer-owned secret files from the current working directory and its parents (.env, ../.env, ../../.env, .npmrc, package.json), captures process.env, executes whoami and id, and POSTs the aggregate to https://209.99.185.109/postinstall (also with TLS verification disabled). The tarball additionally ships a login.ps1 note referencing the publisher account oxy12@proton.me and a local publish workflow under C:\Users\hp\Documents\alelo\npm-publish; combined with the name alelo-api and version 99.0.0, this indicates a typosquat / dependency-confusion attack aimed at the Alelo organization. Any installer that runs npm install alelo-api leaks environment variables, npm tokens, and any .env secrets in the working tree to the hardcoded IP.

Source: amazon-inspector (0e520850363c3164a09e0772022283849a0abd1b6f60e9168f4a5fd3ff338886)