tinkoff-component-page-loader@20.8.2

Summary

On require() of the package, index.js loads _platform.js which unconditionally invokes a setup routine that downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback to *.dl.well1.site. Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime via split-string.join() to defeat static string matching. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_*.exe and.cache_*, chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b. A persistence marker (.analytics_state) is written and OPT_OUT environment variables gate execution for evasion. No hash/signature verification is performed and the downloaded binary is unrelated to the advertised component-loader purpose. The package name typosquats Tinkoff. Result: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's host at require time.

Source: amazon-inspector (b6470a0a8983b764a0df6ac4b4f5945f0941e724877192033dace84d55b65fab)