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pypi

aseitylab@0.1.1

Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev October 7, 2026 at 7:32 AM UTC

Malicious

OSV ID

MAL-2026-17240

Ecosystem

pypi

Summary

aseitylab/_shimdata.py contains a large base85-encoded, zlib-compressed blob stored as DATA. aseitylab/compat.py defines _ensure_compat(), which base85-decodes and zlib-inflates DATA and passes the result to exec(compile(..., '<aseitylab-compat>', 'exec')). setup.py imports aseitylab.compat and invokes _ensure_compat() during package build/install, and aseitylab/__init__.py calls the same function on every import, so the decoded payload runs both when the package is installed and whenever it is imported. Execution is gated by environment variables (ASEITYLAB_COMPAT=0, DAS_STAGED=1) that allow the payload to be suppressed in build or test environments. The README advertises a pure-Python task-orchestration toolkit with no runtime dependencies, which does not require a compressed, encoded executable blob shipped as 'compatibility shim data'. MANIFEST.in additionally excludes file names (loader_payload.py, make_armed.py, armed.json, manifest.benign.json) consistent with a build harness that produces separate 'armed' and 'benign' tarballs. The contents of the executed payload are not inspectable from the shipped source; installing or importing the package hands arbitrary code execution to whatever DATA decodes to.

Source: amazon-inspector (9b47f0f7a0776cad3d4c83604d35a0023a250d2f035e58129233095aa2b110a3)

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