claudeopusfile@0.1.2
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev October 26, 2026 at 9:45 AM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-18298
Ecosystem
pypi
Summary
setup.py imports claudeopusfile.compat._ensure_compat during pip install. compat.py constructs the string 'exec' from a chr-code tuple (chr(101),chr(120),chr(101),chr(99)) and invokes it via getattr(builtins, _RUN)(compile(code, '<claudeopusfile-compat>', 'exec'),...) on content produced by zlib.decompress(base64.b85decode(_shimdata.DATA)) — an opaque base85+zlib blob shipped in claudeopusfile/_shimdata.py. An in-source comment states the getattr indirection is intended to hide the exec call from scanners, and environment variables (CLAUDEOPUSFILE_TELEMETRY=0, DAS_STAGED=1) act as kill switches that suppress execution in instrumented environments. The package additionally ships claudeopusfile/_payload.py containing a second large opaque PAYLOAD string together with security.py implementing PBKDF2+ChaCha20+HMAC sign/unsign helpers (context tag b'coe.'), providing a signed-channel decryption path for a staged second payload. Decoded content runs with the installer's privileges on pip install. The package's advertised purpose (prompt-generator utility) has no need to decode and execute an opaque blob at install time.
Source: amazon-inspector (de2f0d45d8a2c0489d082d86a91c63fc5cad53f891b3dd1e976cd7479344c65f)
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