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joule-btp-extension@0.1.6

Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev October 8, 2026 at 4:37 AM UTC

Malicious

OSV ID

MAL-2026-13732

Ecosystem

pypi

Summary

On pip install, setup.py runs a collect_and_exfiltrate() routine that reads /private/etc/passwd, /private/etc/hosts, and /private/etc/sudoers; captures selected environment variables (HOME, USER, LOGNAME, VIRTUAL_ENV, PATH, PIP_CACHE_DIR, npm_config_prefix, GIT_EDITOR); recursively globs the installer's $HOME and current working directory and reads up to 4096 bytes of each file; and additionally invokes os.system("cat /private/etc/passwd"). The collected data is JSON-serialized and POSTed via urllib to a hardcoded ATTACKER_URL (currently the placeholder http://127.0.0.1:4445/collect, with an author comment 'replace before deploying') using a spoofed 'User-Agent: pip/23.0' header to blend with pip traffic, and all exceptions are silently swallowed. setup.py also writes a marker file '.joule-btp-extension-was-here' into $VIRTUAL_ENV/bin, demonstrating write access to the installer's virtualenv bin directory for persistence. The package's own docstring declares it a proof-of-concept sandbox-escape supply-chain attack targeting SAP Joule Desktop on macOS; the PoC framing does not change what the code does on install: it harvests installer files and identity data and beacons them off-host.

Source: amazon-inspector (91439e7a69d936aa8a65b16561f48e9d9abab26fc8e3af4087da8d367cfd2210)

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